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Abstract:   
Can debt rescheduling decisions differ in multiple lenders’ versus a single lender loan? 
Do multiple lenders efficiently react to information? We show that the precision of 
information plays an essential role. Foreclosing by one lender is disruptive so that a 
lender can rationally wait for the decision of other lenders, rescheduling her loan, if she 
expects that other lenders receive more precise information. We develop a Bayesian 
game where signals of different precision are randomly distributed to lenders. Both, 
premature liquidation and excessive rescheduling are possible in equilibrium, according 
to the pattern of information. However this is a second-best outcome, given that private 
information cannot be optimally shared. 
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1 Introduction
Large defaults by rms or sovereign debtors repeatedly raise the concern that
lenders are deaf to alarm bells and do not act in time, letting the costs of the
ensuing default inate. Conrming these worries, CEOs at prominent banks
have occasionally admitted to poor lending decisions.1 Often they share
the responsibility with other lenders, since loans to large borrowers usually
originate from multiple creditors  a feature that in many countries is also
shared by smaller size loans, as witnessed by extensive empirical ndings
(Detragiache et al. 2000, Ongena and Smith 2000, Berger et al. 2001). It
is therefore natural to ask whether the presence of multiple lenders may be
related to excessive lending and unwarranted roll-over of existing debt.
The passivity issue is treated in Diamond (2004), who bases his analysis
on the idea that where creditorslegal rights are poorly enforced there is little
incentive for lenders to ask for repayment by going to court  because this
reduces the overall value of collectibles. Diamond then argues that creditors
multiplicity can create a commitment to stop renancing a borrower if the
signal received points to his misbehavior, provided the debt contract is made
short term (i.e. shorter than the projects cash-delivery time). Commitment
comes from a Nash equilibrium at the renancing stage where there is a
run on the debtors assets. An increase in enforcement costs increases the
tendency to passivity and the number of creditors needed to overcome it.
By contrast, the prominent view is that a bias towards liquidation pre-
vails under multiple lenders, stemming either from an insu¢ cient collateral-
izing of the debt, with lenders precipitating a runon the debtors assets, or
1To illustrate, Lord Stevenson, the former chairman of HBOS, has admitted that
the bank was guilty of a lot of mistaken lending in the run up to its near collapse in
2008". In: Former HBOS chairman admits bank was guilty of a lot of mistaken lending,
The Telegraph, Monday December 10, 2012. Also, in the same article: Lord Stevenson
responded: I deeply regret the mistakes made in the corporate lending book, and with the
wisdom of hindsight I wish we could have done things to obviate them.
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from free-riding incentives in renegotiation which may hamper the recovery
of valuable concerns (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996, Gertner and Scharfstein
1991, Detragiache and Garella 1996). While the circumstances leading to
excess liquidation or insu¢ cient participation in debt restructuring are fairly
well explored, the literature so far has not analyzed whether multiple lenders
may also su¤er from passivity, and why, delaying the necessary resolutions.
Empirically, a negative correlation has been observed between the num-
ber of lenders and the quality of borrowers; see Foglia et al. (1998) for
Italy, Degryse and Ongena (2001) for Norway, Elsas and Krahnen (1998)
and Harho¤ and Korting (1998) for Germany. This may be taken as an
indication that the premature liquidation bias is not universal, as it would
imply a predominance of type 1 errors(worthwhile borrowers cut o¤) and
not of type 2 (allowing bad loans to continue). In the literature one can nd
theories that, as well as our model, may accommodate the empirical negative
relation: adverse selection bias at the stage when loans are granted (Bris
and Welch 2005), with multiple lenders attracting lemons, or ine¤ective
monitoring by lenders after granting the loan (Carletti 2004).2
The present paper explores the incentives to reschedule or foreclose when
there are multiple lenders. In our analysis both excessive liquidation and
excessive rescheduling are possible. Our novel result, however, is that mul-
tiple lenders may be inclined to reschedule when receiving information that
would otherwise have triggered liquidation in a sole lender loan. The result
is based on information asymmetries between lenders. We assume that the
information available to individual creditors can di¤er in quality, i.e., it may
be more or less accurate or precise. We show that a lender receiving a given
piece of unfavorable information will often take a di¤erent decision depend-
ing on whether he is the sole lender or is part of a loan involving multiple
lenders.
In everyday life, decisions are often delegated due to di¤erences in the
2 In Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung (2007), however, results on monitoring are nuanced.
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quality of information. For instance, when choosing a restaurant as tourists,
we rely upon our own judgment if alone, while in company of locals we will
rely upon them to pick the restaurant. Similarly, when voting in a commit-
tee we sometimes abstain and rely on colleagues with superior information
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996). However, there are counterexamples, e.g.
when personal preferences matter or when the ranking of alternatives is sub-
jective, so that the precise payo¤ functions and rules of the game matter.
What then if a lender has to decide between going for liquidation or
rescheduling a loan? If other lenders are also involved, she may wonder if
her information is as reliable or accurate as that of the other lenders. We
argue that, if it is likely that the others have superior information, then one
may wish to avoid triggering liquidation and instead decide to reschedule.
Specically, we show that it is rational for a lender receiving unfavorable
but imprecise information to be less inclined to foreclose than if he were the
sole lender. Of course, given that information can be more or less precise,
the opposite argument that comes to mind is whether a lender receiving
imprecise but favorable information may also decide to rely on others to be
better informed, with a rebalancing e¤ect o¤setting the tendency to more
rescheduling. The point is that there is an asymmetry here: a lender with
favorable information, be it precise or not, does not change her behavior
because as sole lender she would also reschedule.
In our analysis lenders may be di¤erentially informed because informa-
tion is soft and therefore di¢ cult to share. Two lenders participate in the
nancing of a project. The project can either be successful and repay the
loans at maturity or it can run into problems, implying that rescheduling of
both loans is needed if the project is to continue. At that stage, each cred-
itor must decide between rescheduling or foreclosing after receiving signals
about the continuation value of the project. The signals can be of two types
dened by their quality. A high-quality signal is more informative than a
low-quality one (as under an inclusion relation) and may point to the same
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or to a di¤erent course of action. A lender observes her own signal and is
aware of its quality, but does not know the quality and content of the signal
received by the other lender. In the basic model, there is no exchange of in-
formation and the creditors do not coordinate their actions. In an extension
we discuss why communication between lenders will not ensure complete
information sharing.
We analyze the equilibria of the game of incomplete information played
by lenders and show that the equilibria always entail more rescheduling by
poorly informed lenders then under a sole lender arrangement. There are
cases where premature liquidation can also arise in equilibrium. In partic-
ular, this occurs when a lender receives a poor quality signal that is very
unfavorable to continuation and when the probability of the other lender be-
ing better informed is small enough. We also discuss the e¢ ciency properties
of the equilibria. The issue is whether there is too much rescheduling, i.e.,
too much wait and see, or by contrast too much premature liquidation.
We nd that, although decisions are ine¢ cient compared to the rst best
under full sharing of information, they need not be ine¢ cient in a second-
best sense given the constraint that information cannot be shared. >From
a social point of view, the creditorsequilibrium strategies may exhibit op-
timal reliance on the possibility that others are better informed, i.e., the
strategies optimally trade-o¤ the risk of unwarranted continuation against
that of premature liquidation.
The literature on creditorspassivity is not large. Existing explanations,
besides the one by Diamond (2004), rely on the banks incentives to hide
their problem loans (Rajan 1994, Mitchell 2001) or to gamble for resurrec-
tion (Perotti 1993). Our explanation is therefore novel. With respect to
the issue of coordination failures and liquidation bias, Gennaioli and Rossi
(2012) discuss the use of oating charge debt and a dual class of debt. We
take the short-term debt contract form as exogenous and stress instead the
e¤ects of information asymmetries on the lendersincentives to reschedule
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loans. Carletti et al. (2007) discuss the possibility that monitoring incentives
can in some cases be enhanced by the presence of multiple lenders; Dewa-
tripont and Maskin (1995) analyze the basic externality in monitoring with
two lenders. There is no monitoring activity in our model, i.e., information
is taken to exogenously become available to the bank managers.
With respect to actions determined by the information of other players,
the main strand of research is that of herding phenomena (Banerjee 1992,
Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Herding has been tested as an explanation
for excessive lending in Japan (see Uchida and Nakagawa 2007) and in sov-
ereign debtors crises (Calvo and Mendoza 2000 and the references therein).
However, herding implies that before taking his decision a player observes
other playersactions, in a sequence of moves, so as to infer something about
these playersinformation. Without that inference a player would act the
same way as if she were alone. Our set-up, by contrast, hinges upon a
player not being able to observe or to infer the type of information received
by the other player. We show that the problem may arise whether or not
the playersactions are simultaneous; we discuss an extension to sequential
moves where this applies. Hence, although herding also leads to decisions
that di¤er from what a player would have done if alone, the mechanism of
reliancewe describe is di¤erent.
To interpret our results, it should be emphasized that they also hold
when distortions are introduced in the payo¤s that tip the balance towards
more premature liquidation: in an extension, we show that the likelihood
of triggering premature liquidation increases if an advantage to be the rst
creditor to go for liquidation is introduced. However, we also show the incen-
tives to relynevertheless persist and mitigates the e¤ect of the rst-mover
advantage. When such an advantage is present, the comparison with a sole
lenders behavior is of course not literally possible and can only be made by
analogy with the full information situation. Overall, our model rationalizes
that postponement of action (or passivity) will be observed in loans with
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multiple lenders and discusses some of the conditions leading to such behav-
ior. To illustrate, if it were common knowledge that one particular lender is
more likely to be better informed, then she will be the one to whom liquida-
tion decisions are delegated (Franks and Sussman 2005 discuss the empirical
importance of concentrated liquidation rights).
The paper develops as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
derive some properties of the signals. In Section 3 we derive the equilibrium
strategies at the rescheduling stage. In Section 4 we discuss the e¢ ciency
properties of the equilibria. In Section 5, we explore additional issues and
extensions of the basic model. Section 6 concludes and discusses some em-
pirical implictions.
2 The model
The game unfolds over three periods. At date 0, an entrepreneur with no
initial wealth seeks nancing for a project. Two lenders, henceforth the
banks, participate in equal measure to the provision of funds by means of
debt contracts. The project is large or banks are small, so that nancing
must be obtained from two banks. The amount to be raised from each bank,
L, is normalized to 1. For each loan, the face value of the repayment due at
date 1 is denoted by B. The credit market is competitive and lenders earn
zero expected prot in equilibrium. Since the project is of xed size, the
conditions leading to positive prots for banks, like in Bennardo et al. (2009)
and Attar et al. (2010), do not apply here. To simplify the exposition, the
opportunity cost of funds is set equal to zero.
With probability , where 0 <  < 1, the project succeeds (a good state
of Nature realizes) and is completed by date 1, yielding the total return 2R.
We assume R large enough to ensure R  B for any face value B consistent
with nonnegative expected prots to lenders  this implies that B > 1 will
result, given the normalization L = 1. With probability 1   , the project
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is not completed and runs into di¢ culties (bad state of Nature); the loan
then cannot be paid back at date 1 as scheduled. A creditor then has two
options. He can either foreclose on his loan or roll it over, namely allow
the debtor to repay one period later than due. The project continues only
if both banks reschedule, otherwise it is liquidated; i.e., foreclosing by one
bank eventually forces foreclosing by the other lender.3
In the bad state of Nature, each bank recuperates the amount L < 1
at date 1 if it forecloses. For instance, as means of realizing the project,
the debtor produced or acquired assets that act as collateral and can be
individually repossessed by the banks. If one bank seizes its share of these
assets, continuation of the project is unfeasible, which is why foreclosure
by one bank forces foreclosing by the other.4 In our context, rescheduling
therefore amounts to a commitment to wait for repayment conditional on
continuation of the project. If the project is allowed to continue, the assets in
place are transformed into a random return available at date 2. This yields
the amount 2X where the random variable X has an absolutely continuous
distribution with the interval [0; 1] as support.5 Thus, the total nal return
upon continuation is always less than the amount borrowed. Because the
banks own equal claims, they share the total nal return equally, i.e., each
bank recoups X. Table 1 summarizes the playerspayo¤s.
The prior (date 0) expected value of X is x. At date 1, however, before
the rescheduling or foreclosing decision, each bank independently obtains
some information about X. This information can be of two types: poor
or good. A lender is accordingly said to be either poorly informed or well
3The framework so far resembles Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).
4Hart and Moore (1998) and von Thadden et al. (2010), among others, assume constant
returns to scale: if, say, half the assets are seized, the project continues but at half size. By
contrast, our project is indivisible or assets in place are perfect complements. Equivalently,
seizure of half the assets is su¢ ciently detrimental to make continuation unambiguously
unprotable for the other lender.
5Throughout we use capital letters to denote a random variable and the corresponding
lower case letter for a particular realization.
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informed (interchangeably, better informed). Poor information (e.g., ru-
mors) is represented by the signal Y which for simplicity both lenders are
assumed to observe. Better information is the observation of Y and of some
additional signal Z. The probability that a lender observes both Y and Z
is denoted . With probability 1    a lender observes only Y . Whether
well or poorly informed, a lender does not know if the other has observed
Z, hence she does not know the typeof the other lender.
TABLE 1
Payo¤s from the project
Good state Bad state
liquidation continuation
Entrepreneur 2(R B) 0 0
Banks 2(B   1) 2(L  1) 2(X   1)
Total 2(R  1) 2(L  1) 2(X   1)
The expected value of X given Y = y is denoted by x(y), a strictly
increasing function, i.e., a larger y means more favorable information. The
expected value of X given Y = y and Z = z is denoted by x(y; z), also
an increasing function. Conditional on poor information, continuation is
expected to be more protable than liquidation if x(y)  L. Conditional on
better information, it is expected to be more protable if x(y; z)  L. The
following assumption ensures that better information always matters.
Assumption 1: Pr (x(Y ) < L) is positive. Pr (x(y; Z) > L j y) is posi-
tive for any realization y.
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The condition characterizes the information di¤erential between the sig-
nals. A poorly informed lender expects continuation to be unprotable when
x(y) < L. Such values of y occur with positive probability. However, for any
such y, a poorly informed lender knows that there is a positive probability
that he would change his mind if he were better informed. In other words,
no matter how bad the rumors, the observation of the additional signal is
valuable from a decision-making point of view.
Assumption 2: The random variables X, Y and Z are a¢ liated.
The assumption that the random variables are a¢ liated ensures that
the conditional expectation E [g(Y; Z) j Y = y] is nondecreasing in y, for
any nondecreasing function g.6
The situation we have in mind is one where it can be part of an equilib-
rium for a poorly informed bank to disregard unfavorable information; that
is, the bank may reschedule even though its expectations satisfy x(y) < L.
The intuition is that a poorly informed lender may rely on the possibility
that the other lender is better informed and is therefore able to make more
appropriate decisions. If the other lender forecloses, then foreclosing will
anyway be forced upon the poorly informed lender who chose to reschedule.
For such a reliance strategy to be part of an equilibrium, better infor-
mation must matter from a decision-making point of view, i.e., the event
x(y; Z) > L must have positive probability even though x(y) < L. This is
the rationale for Assumption 1.
In the situation we consider, banks do not share their information and do
not coordinate their actions. One reason is that the information received by
the banks is non veriable or soft. Thus, any exchange of information at date
1 is cheap talk. In particular, it can be shown that announcements about the
protability of continuation are not credible if a small rst-mover advantage
6See Milgrom and Weber (1982). If f(x; y; z) is the joint density, the random variables
are a¢ liated when ln f(x; y; z) has non negative cross derivatives.
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to foreclosure is introduced in our setup. This possibility is analyzed in
Section 5 which also discusses several extensions of our basic setup.
The assumption that continuation requires renancing by both lenders
needs comment. If external nancing could be found, a project that runs
into di¢ culties could be continued even after a refusal to reschedule by the
original lenders. Also, it is possible that one of the original lender tries to
buy the other lender out of the loan. The rst case, issuance of new debt to
be placed on the market, may be too costly because of lemonsproblems
such as discussed in Detragiache et al. (2000). External investors would not
know whether a refusal to renance by the original lenders stems out of an
e¢ cient or ine¢ cient decision. The other way out  that one of the original
lender renances the whole project  may be unfeasible for balance sheet
reasons, as assumed here, or because of bargaining failures. Indeed, with
many lenders, bargaining over lendersquotas will be costly and subject to
hold-up problems. There is much evidence on the di¢ culty of agreements
between creditors and the fact that the risk of bargaining failure is greater
the larger the number of creditors (see Gilson et al. 1990, Asquith et al.
1994, and Gilson 1997). In this respect, our example with two lenders must
be taken only as illustrative. However, even in the case of two lenders, the
well known bargaining failures due to asymmetric information will arise.
3 Rescheduling decisions
In the present Section we analyze the problem faced by lenders at date
1, when the bad state of Nature has occurred. Let for and res refer to
foreclosing and rescheduling respectively. Strategies are denoted by , the
probability that a bank plays for. We write (y) for the strategy played
by a bank which learns only y; similarly, (y; z) is the strategy played by a
better informed bank which learns both y and z. A banks expected payo¤
is denoted by u.
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Bank is expected payo¤ from playing for does not depend on bank js
strategy, where i; j = 1; 2, and i 6= j. The payo¤ is also una¤ected by the
banks information. Thus,
ui(for; j j y) = ui(for; j j y; z) = L; for all y, z: (1)
This is not so for the expected payo¤ from playing res. If bank i is well
informed, its expected payo¤ conditional on observing y and z is
ui(res; j j y; z) =
(1  ) [j(y)L+ (1  j(y))x(y; z)]
+  [j(y; z)L+ (1  j(y; z))x(y; z)] : (2)
On the right-hand side,  is the probability that bank j is well informed. If
the two lenders had di¤erent probabilities of being well informed, i 6= j ,
the right-hand side would contain j in lieu of . Bank is payo¤ depends
on bank js strategies, which depend on the information available to that
bank. When bank j forecloses, foreclosing is forced upon bank i as well,
hence the rst term in L in the two bracketed expressions. When bank j
also reschedules, the project is allowed to continue and bank is payo¤ is the
expected value of continuation conditional on the available information.
If bank i is poorly informed, the expected payo¤ from res is
ui(res; j j y) =
(1  ) [j(y)L+ (1  j(y))x(y)]
+ E [j(y; Z)L+ (1  j(y; Z))x(y; Z) j y] : (3)
The expression is similar to (2) except for the expectation operator in (3)
because a poorly informed bank does not observe Z.
Comparing (1) and (2), it is clear that for is a weakly dominated strategy
for a well informed bank if x(y; z) > L. Rescheduling then yields a larger
expected return than foreclosing if the other bank also reschedules with some
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probability. Conversely, res is weakly dominated if x(y; z) < L. When the
equality holds there is a tie; we take it that the bank then reschedules. By
elimination of weakly dominated strategy, therefore, a well informed bank
chooses
(y; z) =
(
1 if x(y; z) < L;
0 if x(y; z)  L: (4)
This coincides with the socially optimal decision conditional on the obser-
vation of (y; z). It is also the decision rule that a well informed lender would
follow in a sole lender arrangement.
To derive the best response of a poorly informed bank, observe that in
the bad state of Nature max(x(y; z); L) is the expected return that would
accrue to each bank under the socially e¢ cient rescheduling decision. For a
poorly informed bank, given the observation of y, the expected value of this
quantity is E[max(x(y; Z); L) j y]. Using the equilibrium strategy (4) and
substituting in (3), the expected payo¤ from res for a poorly informed bank
can therefore be rewritten as
ui(res; j jy) = (1  ) [j(y)L+ (1  j(y))x(y)]
+ E[max(x(y; Z); L) j y]: (5)
The best response of a poorly informed bank depends on its own expec-
tations about the value of continuation, on the other banks strategy when
the latter is also poorly informed, j(y), and on the likelihood that the
other bank is better informed, . When a poorly informed banks expecta-
tions satisfy x(y)  L, it is obviously better to play res, as would also be
done in a sole lender arrangement. When x(y) < L, the banks best option
depends on how pessimistic it is about the value of continuation and on the
probability that the other bank is better informed; the expression in (5) is
then strictly increasing in . If  is su¢ ciently large, say close to unity, it is
best to play res and rely on the other bank to make the appropriate deci-
sion. Conversely, if  is close to zero, the best move is to play for. Moreover,
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when x(y) < L, the expression in (5) is increasing in j(y). The greater the
probability that the other bank forecloses when poorly informed, the safer
it is to reschedule when one is also poorly informed because the probability
of a wrongcontinuation is then smaller.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, well informed banks follow the socially op-
timal decisions rule as in (4). Poorly informed banks reschedule their loan
when x(y)  L. When x(y) < L; poorly informed banks reschedule if
  b(y)  L  x(y)
E[max(x(y; Z); L) j y]  x(y) : (6)
For x(y) < L and  < b(y), there are two possible pairs of equilibrium
strategies:
(i) In the symmetric equilibrium M , poorly informed banks play a mixed
strategy, rescheduling with the probability
1  (y) = 
1  

E[max(x(y; Z); L) j y]  L
L  x(y)

: (7)
(ii) In the asymmetric equilibrium P , poorly informed banks play pure strate-
gies: one bank reschedules, the other forecloses.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The essence of the result is that a bank with unfavorable but imprecise
information may reschedule because it seems better to delegate decision
making to the other lender. From the perspective of a poorly informed
bank, the other lender may have received more precise information. When
this is su¢ ciently likely, a poorly informed bank completely disregards its
own information and relies fully on the possibility that the other bank is
better informed. Temporizing through a rescheduling decision is then a
dominant strategy; see the proof.
When the likelihood of the other bank being well informed is small, there
are two possibilities. In the pure strategy equilibrium P , one bank is passive
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when poorly informed: it always reschedules and therefore delegates to
the other lender the liquidation versus continuation decision. In turn, the
lender in chargeforecloses, thereby forcing liquidation, when its informa-
tion is poor and su¢ ciently unfavorable, discounting the possibility that the
other bank may have obtained superior information that favors continua-
tion. In the symmetric strategy equilibrium M , poorly informed banks are
indi¤erent between rescheduling or foreclosing when the information is poor
and su¢ ciently unfavorable. The greater the likelihood that the other bank
is well informed, the larger the probability of rescheduling, i.e., of relying on
the other lenders decision.
It is worth emphasizing that if probabilities of being informed di¤ered
across lenders, i 6= j , the expression for is equilibrium mixed strategy
would display j rather than .
It is useful to present the equilibrium strategies under poor information
explicitly as a function of the lenders information, given the exogenous
parameter . Let Xp  x(Y ) denote the expected return from continuation
under poor information, considered as a random variable. The subscript
p means poor. A particular realization is denoted by xp. Similarly the
expected return from continuation under better information is the random
variable Xb  x(Y; Z), where the subscript b means better. Because x(y)
is strictly increasing, the conditional distribution of Xb given Y = y can be
written as a function of xp. Thus, the critical b dened in Proposition 1 can
be rewritten as b(xp)  L  xp
E[max(Xb; L) j xp]  xp
: (8)
Lemma 1 Let xminp be the worst possible expectation when information is
poor. Then b(xp) is strictly decreasing over the interval [xminp ; L] with 1 >b(xminp ) > b(L) = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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The lemma follows from the Assumptions 1 and 2. Because the func-
tion b(xp) is strictly decreasing over the interval [xminp ; L], it has an inverse
over the interval [0; c] where c  b(xminp ). Denote this inverse by '().
Obviously '()  L with strict inequality when  > 0. Let us now dene
bx()  ( xminp if  2 [c; 1];
'() if  2 [0; c):
The function is represented in Figure 1. Note that the curve bx() coincides
with the vertical axis when   c. Our results can now be reformulated as
follows.
Corollary 1 For any , poorly informed lenders reschedule with probability
equal to unity when xp  bx(). For  < c, there are two equilibria which
di¤er with respect to the actions of poorly informed lenders when xp < bx():
either (i) they then play the mixed strategy prescribed by equilibrium M or
(ii) they play the pure strategies prescribed by equilibrium P, i.e., one lender
forecloses while the other reschedules.
1Rcq
q
L maxpx
px
)(ˆqxxp =
1
0 min
px
2R
MP
Fig. 1 Strategies under poor information
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The corollary makes explicit the di¤erence with the decisions that would
be taken in a single-lender loan. Consider the regions in Figure 1. By de-
nition, MP = f(xp; ) : xp < x^()g, R1 = f(xp; ) : x^()  xp < Lg, and
R2 = f(xp; ) : xp  Lg. When poorly informed, the single lender would
reschedule only if xp  L, i.e., he would reschedule in the region R2 and
foreclose in either MP or R1. By contrast, in a two-lender arrangement,
poorly informed lenders reschedule as a pure strategy in either R1 or R2. In
the regionMP , there are two possibilities depending on the equilibrium: (i)
either poorly informed lenders reschedule with the probabilities dened in
(7); or (ii) one of the lender always forecloses while the other always resched-
ules. Altogether, for any positive , a lender in a two-lender arrangement
forecloses less often than he would if he were the sole lender. Moreover, for
any positive , there will be cases (in every equilibrium) where the project is
renanced even though both lenders have obtained information that would
have triggered liquidation in a single-lender arrangement.
4 Ine¢ ciencies
Compared with the rst-best under shared information, ine¢ cient contin-
uation or ine¢ cient liquidation is not surprising. Still, it is of interest to
explore the nature and extent of the ine¢ ciency. Moreover, while the per-
fect sharing of information represents an obvious benchmark, it may be that
improvements could be achieved even though information is not shared. For
instance, bank managers may tighten the rescheduling policy as a response
to regulatory pressure, to reduce the overall risk of the bank portfolio, as
when prudential regulation is reinforced. In our model, this could imply
that a poorly informed bank behaves as in a sole lender arrangement.
Let v denote the amount recuperated on average by each lender from a
project that runs into di¢ culties; v < 1 because the amount recuperated
is either L or X. Recall that a project is successful with probability , in
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which case it yields the return 2R. The net expected value of a project is
therefore
2R+ (1  )2v   2:
Ine¢ cient continuation or liquidation reduce v and therefore reduce the net
expected value of projects.7
Comparison with the rst best. To start, we characterize the rst
best when information is shared. Written as a function of , the expected
amount recuperated from unsuccessful projects is
vFB() = (1  )2Emax(Xp; L) +

1  (1  )2

Emax(Xb; L): (9)
The probability that both banks are poorly informed is (1  )2. When
information is shared, the banks know that only poor information is available
and reschedule if xp  L. This explains the rst term in (9). With the
complementary probability at least one bank is well informed. Because
information is shared, the banks now reschedule if xb  L, which yields the
second term. Note that Emax(Xb; L) > Emax(Xp; L) because Xb is more
informative than Xp with respect to the value of continuation.8 Obviously,
vFB() is increasing in .
Consider now the case where information is not shared, given that each
bank plays the socially optimal  and equilibrium  strategy when well
informed. As noted in the preceding section, the strategy of a poorly in-
formed bank can be expressed as a function of xp. We write the strategies
as 1(xp) and 2(xp) for bank 1 and bank 2 respectively. The amount that
is expected to be recuperated by each lender from unsuccessful projects is
7Because the banks earn zero expected prots, each loan has face value B satisfying
B+(1 )v = 1. The larger v, the smaller B or equivalently the smaller the contractual
rate of interest.
8The inequality follows from Jensens inequality because max(x;L) is a convex function
and E(Xb j Xp) = Xp.
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then
v() = 2Emax(Xb; L)
+
2X
i=1
(1  )E i(Xp)L+  1  i(Xp)E[max(Xb; L) j Xp]	
+ (1  )2E L+ (1  1(Xp))(1  2(Xp))(Xp   L) : (10)
The rst term is for the case where both lenders are well informed, the second
for the case where one is well informed and the other poorly informed. In
the third term, both lenders are poorly informed. If at least one forecloses,
both banks get L; if both reschedule, they each get the expected value of
continuation conditional on the available information.
Substituting for the equilibrium strategies in equation (10) yields the
equilibrium outcome which we denote by v(). Compared with the rst
best under perfect sharing of information, the ine¢ ciency or welfare loss is
()  vFB()  v().
This expression is positive if there is ine¢ cient rescheduling or ine¢ cient
liquidation. In equilibrium, given the strategies described in the preceding
section, ine¢ cient rescheduling can only arise if both lenders are poorly
informed. If both banks are well informed there is no ine¢ cient decision.
If both are poorly informed and xp < L, the e¢ cient outcome would be L
for each bank; however, with probability (1 1(xp))(1 2(xp)) the banks
reschedule and each obtains xp instead of L. If bank 1 is informed and
bank 2 is not (or the converse), the rst best is max(xb; L) but the poorly
informed bank may ine¢ ciently trigger liquidation. It is easily veried that
() = (1  )2E[(1  1(Xp))(1  2(Xp))max(L Xp; 0)]
+ (1  )E (1(Xp) + 2(Xp))E[max(Xb   L; 0) j Xp]	 : (11)
The rst term in the right-hand side is for the case where both lenders are
poorly informed, the second term for the case where one is poorly informed
and the other well informed.
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When   c, the second term vanishes because both banks always
reschedule when poorly informed. The welfare loss then reduces to
() = (1  )2Emax(L Xp; 0): (12)
and is solely due to ine¢ cient continuation. This occurs in the region R1 of
Figure 1.
When  < c, the rst term in (11) remains positive but the second term
is now positive as well. Ine¢ cient continuation occurs in the region R1.
When xp < bx(), a poorly informed lender randomizes between foreclosure
and rescheduling in the mixed strategy equilibrium. Hence, there is then
both ine¢ cient continuation and ine¢ cient liquidation in the region MP of
Figure 1. In the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium, when xp < bx() one
bank always forecloses if poorly informed; the other bank always reschedules
if poorly informed. In the regionMP there is now ine¢ cient liquidation but
no ine¢ cient continuation. The results are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Compared with the rst-best decisions under shared infor-
mation, there is ine¢ cient rescheduling if  2 [c; 1); there is both ine¢ cient
rescheduling and ine¢ cient liquidation if  2 (0; c).
When   c, poorly informed banks always reschedule. Rescheduling
may therefore occur even though both banks have unfavorable information.
Compared with the rst best, the problem is then too much creditor pas-
sivity. When  < c, ine¢ cient liquidation also occurs. The bank in
chargemay foreclose even though the other lender is well informed and has
obtained favorable information. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, a poorly
informed bank may also ine¢ ciently liquidate.
Finally, note that the second term in (11) vanishes as  goes to zero. The
rst term also vanishes because lenders then foreclose whenever xp < L. In
other words, there is maximum waste of information when the probability
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that individual banks are well informed is neither too large nor too small.
When the information is on average either very good ( close to unity) or
very bad ( close to zero), the social loss from the non sharing of information
is negligible. Relying on the other bank to be well informed has negligible
social cost if indeed the other bank is very likely to be well informed. Con-
versely, when the likelihood is small, at least one bank will almost be certain
to liquidate  this is the bank in chargein equilibrium P or both banks
in the symmetric equilibrium.
Second-best decision rules. We now inquire whether the outcome can
be improved by imposing decision rules on banks, subject to the constraint
that the rules are consistent with the banksprivate information. Second-
best optimal decision rules potentially di¤er from the equilibrium strategies
ones only in the event that banks are poorly informed. To characterize the
second-best rules, we therefore choose 1 and 2 in equation (10) so as to
maximize v().
Proposition 3 Subject to the constraint that lenders cannot share informa-
tion, the following decision rules for poorly informed banks are second-best
optimal : if   c, the banks should always reschedule; if  < c, one bank
should always reschedule while the other should reschedule if xp  bx() and
otherwise foreclose.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result is surprising. When lenders obtain information that is not
shared and if the likelihood of better information is su¢ ciently large (i.e.,
  c), there is indeed excessive rescheduling in equilibrium compared with
the rst best under the perfect sharing of information. However, given the
constraint that information cannot be shared, the non cooperative equilib-
rium strategies are then socially optimal in a second-best sense. From a
social point of view, in equilibrium each lender e¢ ciently relies on the pos-
sibility that the other lender is better informed. In particular, the outcome
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would be worse if poorly informed banks acted myopically, foreclosing when
xp < L. There would then be no ine¢ cient rescheduling compared with the
rst best, but this would be more than compensated by too much ine¢ cient
liquidation. When the likelihood of better information is small (i.e.,  < c),
the equilibrium strategies are not necessarily second-best. In the regionMP
of Figure 1, the mixed strategy equilibrium entails ine¢ cient continuation
in a second-best sense. However, this is not so in the asymmetric pure strat-
egy equilibrium. When poorly informed, the bank in charge e¢ ciently
trades-o¤ the risk of ine¢ cient continuation against the risk of ine¢ cient
liquidation.
5 Extensions
There are several ways in which the basic setup can be extended. We discuss
the implications for the reliance strategy described in the preceding sections.
Information. The model made a sharp distinction between the poorly
versus well informed status. A poorly informed lender knew that the other
lender could not be less well informed; a well informed lender knew that the
other could not be better informed. Moreover, there was perfect correla-
tion between the information available to poorly informed lenders  they
observe the same y. Similarly, there was perfect correlation between the
information available to the well informed  they observe the same (y; z).
These assumptions are made for simplicity and are not essential. In a more
realistic environment, it is a matter of degree whether a lender is well or
poorly informed.
To illustrate, suppose that the information is the observation of a sig-
nal within the set fS1; :::; SKg where the signal Sk is more informative than
Sk 1 with respect to the value of continuation, k = 2; :::;K. For each lender,
there is a positive probability of observing any one of these signals. In the
model of the previous sections, K = 2 with S1  Y and S2  (Y; Z). When
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K > 2, a lender observing Sk = sk with k =2 f1;Kg does not know whether
the other lender is more or less precisely informed than herself. Nevertheless,
our basic argument would remain the same. When a lender receives unfavor-
able information about the value of continuation (i.e., x(sk) < L), whether
he reschedules or forecloses depends on how pessimistic he is and on the
likelihood that the other lender is better informed. The smaller k, the more
likely it is that the other lender is better informed. Under appropriate con-
ditions on the informational di¤erential between signals, an equilibrium will
be characterized by critical values bxk  L, with strict inequalities for small
values of k, such that a lender observing sk reschedules if x(sk)  bxk. The
critical values bxk are nondecreasing in k; that is, the rather poorly informed
are more likely to reschedule when they have pessimistic expectations, the
rather well informed are more likely to foreclose.
Several lenders. We now revert to the case of two signals as in the
basic setup but allow the number of lenders to be N + 1 where N > 1.
As before, foreclosure by a single lender triggers liquidation of the project.
Denote by  the probability that an individual lender is well informed.
With minor modications, the equilibrium will then be as before but with
  1  (1   )N , i.e.,  is the probability that at least one of the other N
lenders is well informed.
When   c, poorly informed lenders reschedule irrespective of their
information. Again, this is second-best e¢ cient. When  < c, there is a
symmetric equilibrium with lenders rescheduling if xp  bx(), where the
latter function is dened as before; if xp < bx(), a poorly informed lender
forecloses with the probability (xp) satisfying
(1  (xp))N = 
1  

E[max(Xb; L) j xp]  xp
L  xp

: (13)
The argument is the same as in Proposition 1. From the point of view of
a poorly informed lender observing xp < bx(), the left-hand side of (13)
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is the probability that all other lenders reschedule when poorly informed.
Hence it is the probability of continuation if he himself reschedules and all
other lenders are poorly informed. When  < c, there is also an asymmet-
ric equilibrium in pure strategies: N lenders always reschedule irrespective
of their information, while one lender, the one in charge, forecloses if
xp < bx() and otherwise reschedules. Again, the asymmetric equilibrium is
second-best e¢ cient.
As N is increased with  constant, the likelihood that at least one of
the other lenders is well informed increases. Loosely speaking, there is then
more rescheduling but the welfare loss due to the non sharing of information
nevertheless decreases.9 It is also of interest to consider the e¤ect of a larger
N while the information available to lenders as a group does not change,
i.e.,  is reduced so as to keep  constant. The consequence is now that
the overall extent of rescheduling remains unchanged. In equation (13),
the probability of foreclosing (xp) is smaller so as to keep constant the
probability of simultaneous rescheduling by N poorly informed lenders.
Of course, as N gets large, it becomes less reasonable to assume that
foreclosure by a single lender triggers liquidation of the project. But then
our basic argument still holds mutatis mutandis if  is redened as the
probability that at least N1 of the other lenders are well informed, where
foreclosure by N1 lenders is su¢ cient to trigger liquidation.
Relationship lending. An interesting comparison is with the case
where only one bank, say bank A, can observe both Z and Y with probability
A > 0, while bank B can only observe Y . The regions in Figure-1 above
where rescheduling occurs then di¤er across banks. When poorly informed,
bank A will reschedule only if xp  L; otherwise it forecloses because it
cannot rely upon bank B to be better informed. Obviously, when it is well
9For any given  ,  increases with N . A su¢ ciently large N therefore implies  > c,
in which case poorly informed lenders always reschedule. The welfare loss then satises
(12) and becomes arbitrarily small as N gets large.
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informed, bank A takes the e¢ cient action. The best reply of bank B when
it is poorly informed is therefore to always reschedule: if bank A is also
poorly informed, they both have the same information and bank A will
foreclose anyway when xp < L; otherwise bank A has superior information
and can be counted upon to take a more e¢ cient decision. The equilibrium
P arises naturally here. Our model therefore suggests that in situations
where the superior information of a lender is a structural feature of the loan
arrangement, as when there is a relationship lender in the agreement, it
is normal that this lender takes up the role of leader. The role would
be preserved when there is a unique relationship bank and several other
participants in a loan instead of just one. Syndicated loans can also be a
case in point.
First-mover advantage in foreclosure. Returning to the two-lender
case, we now explore the implications of a rst-mover advantage in fore-
closure. Assets in place at date 1 have a liquidation value of 2L. If a
bank forecloses while the other reschedules, the former gets to liquidate the
amount L + ". Foreclosure is then ultimately forced upon the other lender
as well, but this lender is now second in line and can recuperate only the
residual value L   ". When both simultaneously foreclose, they each get L
as before.10
A rst-mover advantage in foreclosure tilts the equilibrium strategies
towards more frequent foreclosure. As a result, it may remedy some of
the excess rescheduling (compared with the rst best), but at the cost of
more frequent ine¢ cient liquidation. To see this, let bxb" denote the equilib-
rium cuto¤ such that a well informed bank reschedules when its expectation
10See von Thadden et al. (2010) for a similar formulation of the uncoordinated debt
collection game. An interpretation is that the debt contracts give each lender a foreclosure
right equal to L + ", so that the sum of foreclosure rights exceeds assets in place. See
also Gennaioli and Rossi (2012) who discuss the role of asymmetric debt structures for
mitigating liquidation bias.
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satises xb  bxb". When " is zero, the cuto¤ equals L and decisions by
well informed lenders are socially e¢ cient. With a small positive ", a well
informed bank will forecloses when xb is slightly above L. One reason is
the possibility of gaining the rst-mover advantage should the other lender
reschedule. Another is that rescheduling is dangerous because the other
lender might foreclose. A poorly informed bank will anticipate that the
other lender, if well informed, will be more prone to foreclose. Its strategy
may therefore also change and lean more towards foreclosure. At one ex-
treme, if " is large enough, the advantage from foreclosing is so great that
it becomes a dominant strategy, irrespective of the lenders information.
Otherwise, when " is not too large, equilibrium strategies are similar
to those already studied, though with more ine¢ cient liquidation than if
" = 0. We illustrate with the case where  is large enough for the strategy
of a poorly informed bank to be una¤ected by the rst-mover advantage in
foreclosure; that is, as before, poorly informed lenders reschedule irrespective
of their information. Let F ( j xp) be the conditional cumulative distribution
of Xb given xp. In the basic setup, a poorly informed lender reschedules
irrespective of his information when  is greater than
bc  L  xminp
E[max(Xb; L) j xminp ]  xminp
=
L  xminp
F (L j xp)L+ (1  F (L j xp))E[Xb j Xb  L; xminp ]  xminp
:
With a positive ", a poorly informed always reschedules when  is greater
than
bc"  L+ "  xminp
F (L+ " jxp)L+ (1  F (L+ " jxp))E[Xb jXb  L+ "; xminp ]  xminp
:
The argument for deriving the critical bc" is as follows. First, if the poorly
informed always reschedule, the equilibrium strategy of a well informed is
to reschedule if xb  L + " and otherwise to foreclose. Second, given this
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strategy on the part of the well informed, a lender observing xp and expecting
the other lender to reschedule if poorly informed will himself reschedule if
(1  )xp
+ 

F (L+ " jxp)(L  ") + (1  F (L+ " jxp))E[Xb jXb  L+ "; xp]
	
 (1  )(L+ ") +  fF (L+ " jxp)L+ (1  F (L+ " jxp))(L+ ")g :
The left-hand side is the expected payo¤ from rescheduling, the right-hand
side the payo¤ from foreclosure. It can be veried that, if the condition
holds for some xp and , it also holds for any larger value (indeed, given
Assumption 2, F ( j xp) is decreasing in xp). This is easily seen to yield the
critical bc". This threshold is less than unity only if " is not too large. Our
basic setup was the limiting case when " is negligible.
Timing. Abstracting from any rst-mover advantage, we now consider
the possibility that the loans do not have the same maturity. The conse-
quence is that one bank will need to move rst. Suppose that repayment
of the loan from bank 1 is due at date 1, while that from bank 2 is due
at the slighter later date 1b. As before, it is known at date 1 whether the
project has run into di¢ culties and the lenders then independently receive
information about the value of continuation.
The di¤erence with the basic setup is that the lenders now play in se-
quence. Bank 1 makes its rescheduling versus foreclosure decision at date
1. Denote its strategy by 1() where the dot refers to the banks private
information. Bank 2 makes its decision at date 1b after observing the action
of bank 1. Its strategy is described by 2(a1; ) where a1 2 fres; forg refers
to bank 1s action and the dot refers to bank 2s private information. One
can show the following. Let 1() and 2() be equilibrium strategies of the
simultaneous game, as derived in the preceding sections. Then 1() = 1()
and 2(for; ) = 1, 2(res; ) = 2() are equilibrium strategies of the se-
quential game. In other words, with respect to continuation or liquidation
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of the project, the outcome is the same as in the simultaneous game.
We provide the argument for the case where   c. In the simultane-
ous game, poorly informed lenders then always reschedule, i.e., 1(xp) =
2(xp) = 0 for all xp. In the sequential game, suppose the strategy of bank
1 is 1() = 1(). When bank 1 has foreclosed, bank 2 cannot prevent
liquidation of the project, so it is a best response for bank 2 to foreclose as
well.11 When bank 1 has rescheduled, bank 2s decision matters. If bank
2 is well informed, it is obviously best to foreclose if xb < L and otherwise
to reschedule, as prescribed by the equilibrium strategy of the simultaneous
game. If bank 2 is poorly informed, it must infer from bank 1s reschedul-
ing decision that either bank 1 is also poorly informed or that it is well
informed and Xb  L. If it has observed xp, bank 2s expected payo¤ from
rescheduling is therefore
(1  )xp + E[Xb jXb  L; xp]:
Now
(1  )xp + E[Xb j Xb  L; xp] > (1  )xp + E[max(Xb; L) j xp];
where the right-hand side is at least as large as L. By denition of c,
the above inequality holds for any   c and any xp. Hence, bank 2s
best response when poorly informed is to reschedule when bank 1 has itself
rescheduled.
Finally, consider bank 1s decision given that bank 2 plays as stated. If
bank 1 is well informed, it obviously takes the socially e¢ cient decision. If
it is poorly informed and reschedules, its expected payo¤ is
(1  )xp + E[max(Xb; L) j xp]  L:
Hence bank 1 always reschedules when   c. Thus, for either bank, there
11 In this equilibrium, as will become obvious, a poorly informed bank 2 will infer from
bank 1s foreclosure decision that bank 1 was well informed and Xb < L.
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is the same degree of reliance as in the simultaneous setup on the possibility
that the other lender is better informed.12
Information sharing. When the lenders move in sequence, some in-
formation is conveyed by the rst movers action. We now consider explicit
attempts to exchange information. Suppose the same situation as in our
basic setup. However, at date 1, before they simultaneously decide on fore-
closure or rescheduling, the lenders can now make announcements. For
clarity, the communication game is taken to be played at date 1, while nal
decisions are made at the slightly later date 1b.
Consider the following possible announcements: yes and no com-
ment. The announcement yesis shorthand for I obtained favorable in-
formation and intend to reschedule; no commentmeans that the lender
says nothing. This is all that is needed to convey the information required
for e¢ cient decision making at date 1b. The following strategies are part
of an equilibrium: at date 1, a lender says yes if he obtained favorable
information (i.e., he is well informed and xb  L or poorly informed and
xp  L), he says no comment if he obtained unfavorable information; at
date 1b, a lender who said yesreschedules as announced, a well informed
lender who said no commentforecloses, a poorly informed lender who said
no commentreschedules if the other lender said yesand otherwise fore-
closes. Indeed, following the announcement of yesby his counterpart, a
poorly informed lender with unfavorable information infers that the other is
well informed and that Xb  L, hence he reschedules. Following no com-
ment, he infers that either the other lender is well informed and Xb < L
or that the other lender is also poorly informed, hence he forecloses. There
is no incentive to mislead. In particular, it is in the interest of a well in-
formed lender with favorable information to prevent foreclosure by the other
12The behavior of bank 2, which disregards privately obtained bad news, is reminiscent
of herding behavior as in Banerjee (1992). However, the analogy is misleading. Bank 1,
which moves rst, also disregards bad news when poorly informed.
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lender (should he be poorly informed), hence to announce yes. Thus, a
communication stage allows to coordinate on the rst-best decisions at date.
It is easily seen, however, that such an equilibrium is not robust to a
small rst-mover advantage in foreclosure. A well informed bank announcing
yeswill play as announced only if xb  L + ". But then a well informed
bank observing xb < L+" would gain from making the same announcement
if it thought it would be believed (which requires that the other lender is
poorly informed), because it would then be the rst mover in foreclosure.
A similarly argument holds for a poorly informed lender observing xp <
L + ". Thus, in equilibrium, favorable announcements will not be believed
and will be equivalent to being told nothing, no matter how small ". In
the terminology of cheap-talk games, announcements are then neither self-
committing nor self-signalling, hence they are not credible (see Farrell and
Rabin, 1996). It follows that decisions at date 1b will be the same as in our
basic setup.13
We now consider a variant that does not rely on cheap talk. As a result,
the communication game is robust to a small rst-mover advantage in fore-
closure.14 A date 1b is added: at date 1 a lender can now take each of the
three actions: foreclose, reschedule, and wait. This change opens up the
possibility for lenders to choose to be rst movers; specically, a well in-
formed bank may want to move rst to guarantee that the e¢ cient decision
is taken. A lender who chose "wait" can still foreclose or reschedule at date
1b. Waiting expresses uneasiness with the situation. When the rst-mover
advantage in foreclosure is su¢ ciently small, it is easily shown that the fol-
lowing strategies are part of an equilibrium: at date 1, a lender reschedules
if he has favorable information (i.e., he is well informed and xb  L + "
or poorly informed and xp  L + "), he forecloses if well informed and
13The outcome is the same if the set of possible announcements is enriched to, say, I
am well informed and intend to reschedule, I am well informed and intend to foreclose,
and I am poorly informed.
14We thank a referee for pointing out this possibility.
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xb < L+ ", otherwise he waits; at date 1b, a lender who waited reschedules
if the other lender rescheduled at date 1 and otherwise forecloses. In this
equilibrium, when both lenders played wait, they learn that they are both
poorly informed and therefore coordinate on the socially e¢ cient decisions
when " is small. When " is zero, the play of waitby a poorly informed
lender observing xp < L yields the expected payo¤
(1  )L+ E[max(Xb; L) j xp] > L: (14)
Because the inequality is strict, the strategies described above constitute an
equilibrium when " is positive and su¢ ciently small. Note that in (14) the
payo¤ from waiting exhibits reliance on the possibility that the other lender
is better informed.
However, the model with two types of signal has been used only for
convenience and is aimed at representing more general situations. It is
su¢ cient to haveK > 2 signal types to jeopardize the feasibility of e¢ ciently
sharing information. For instance, suppose that the signals independently
made available to the two lenders are drawn from the set fS1; :::; SKg, as
earlier in this section. For simplicity assume K = 3 and let the probabilities
be i, for i = 1; 2; 3. The actions foreclose, reschedule and wait will then
not reveal all relevant information. Under appropriate conditions on the
informational di¤erential between signals and setting " equal to zero, one
may generate situations (with 3 high enough) where the equilibrium by
which the maximum separation of types obtains is only semi-pooling. The
following strategies are part of the equilibrium: at date 1, if a lender receives
S3 she plays for or res immediately, according to what is e¢ cient. The
posteriors on observing a player playing for or res are therefore that she has
received signal S3 with probability 1. However, a lender receiving S2 or S1
will play wait in order not to be pooled with type S3, least she should trigger
the wrong action at stage 1b. This leads again to the situation we described
with the two-signal model analyzed above. Hence, a reliance strategy similar
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to the ones described in this paper will be part of the equilibrium.15
Alternatively, one may stick to the simple two-signal framework but
allow the more informative signal to be made available at either date 1
or date 1b but now with date 1b acting as a deadline, in the sense that
a project cannot balance between liquidation or continuation beyond that
date.16 Suppose both lenders waited because they had unfavorable informa-
tion at date 1 but were poorly informed. At date 1b, a lender who remains
poorly informed will take into account the possibility that by then the other
lender may have obtained superior information that is favorable. Because
they cannot wait any longer, the lenders are then essentially in the same
situation as in our basic setup.
6 Concluding remarks
The idea explored in the present paper is that ex-post ine¢ cient rescheduling
may arise in the sense that lenders chose to disregard bad signals. We nd
however that, with some qualications, ex-ante e¢ ciency may be preserved
in the sense that no better decision could have been taken on the basis of the
information available to each lender. While our analysis helps rationalize the
hindsight wisdom often shown by analysts and banksmanagers discussed
at the outset, it also questions the view that a liquidation bias dominates
at the renancing stage under arrangements involving multiple lenders. An
ill informed bank knows that its mistake in rescheduling can be corrected
by better informed lenders, while a mistake in liquidating is, in our story,
15As suggested by a referee, an extended communication game over as many stages as
there are types of signals could restaure the possibility of information sharing. With K
possible signals ordered in terms of informativeness and K stages, a player observing the
signal Sk would announce his decision to reschedule or foreclose at stage K   k.
16 If no decision is reached by that date, assets in place are transformed into continuation
and liquidation value falls to zero. Alternatively, continuation value is jeopardized and
waiting amounts to liquidation.
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irreversible.
In practice, foreclosing is a drastic decision, leading to a halt in the
execution of a project and to liquidation, only if creditor rights are well
protected and repossession of the debtors assets is swift and frictionless.
This is not necessarily so. Prevailing codes ensure that debtor rights are
preserved under liquidation or that debtors can appeal to special protection
such as Chapter 11 in the U.S. We point out, however, that the liquida-
tion outcome in our model need not mean bankruptcy in the legal sense.
A loans liquidation value should be interpreted as reecting the payment
expected by a lender, taking into account the disruption caused by foreclo-
sure, and given the collateral arrangements, the prevailing legislation, and
the e¢ ciency of the legal system.
Some empirical implications follow from our model. One should observe
a decrease in liquidation by small lenders when a main bank is present in
the loan. Such a pattern prevails when there is a relationship lender or main
bank in a loan arrangement with multiple creditors. Overall, therefore, the
small-lenders initiated liquidations should decrease when a relationship bank
can be identied (syndicated loans may also fall in this category). A situa-
tion with asymmetries in the precision of information across lenders may also
arise when lenders do not know whether the management of the borrower
has disclosed the same information to all creditors or only to those with no
conict of interests (for instance only to those who do not lend to rivals so as
to avoid disclosure of R&D results, as discussed in Bhattacharya and Chiesa
1995, Yosha 1995 and Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes 2004).17 In sectors with
high R&D expenditures and where property rights on innovation are crucial,
multiple lenders can exhibit the reliance mechanism more clearly than in ma-
ture and traditional ones. Also, if the rst-mover advantage in liquidation is
reduced or eliminated by the bankruptcy code, then our results predict that
17Guiso and Minetti (2010) also allow for di¤erential information disclosure to multiple
lenders by a borrower.
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delayed liquidation or passivityby multiple lenders would become more
prevalent in countries where court-ruled liquidation procedures prevail; in
particular, where creditors fear precipitating a liquidation procedure which
expose them to the arbitrariness and slowliness of the judicial system 
somewhat recalling the arguments in Diamond (2004).
Finally, the tendency to refuse credit renewals  or the tendency to pre-
mature liquidation  is exacerbated during recessions and lessened during
booms (Rajan 1994, Thakor, 2005). According to our model, a reason why
multiple lenders would go more often for liquidation during slumps may be
that it is then more di¢ cult to disentangle the idiosyncratic shocks to rms
from the general shocks to the sector or the economy. This implies a lower
precision of information available to the main bank or relationship bank in
the loan. When the information is evenly distributed and imprecise (i.e, 
is small) the reliance mechanism tends to break down and the smaller or
less informed lenders will precipitate a run. The identication of a non per-
forming loan as a lemon, by contrast, is quite easy during booms, through
comparisons with similar business, so that the main banks information al-
lows a precise sorting and liquidation is delegated.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: From (1) and (5), when poorly informed, bank
i plays res if
(1  ) [j(y)L+ (1  j(y))x(y)] + E[max(x(y; Z); L) j y]  L: (15)
If x(y)  L, the condition is satised for all j(y). Consider next the case
where x(y) < L. When   b(y) as dened in the proposition, the condition
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(15) holds for j(y) = 0. Moreover, the left-hand side of (15) is increasing
in j(y). Hence, the condition also holds for all j(y), which means that res
is a dominant strategy for bank i. Finally, consider the case where x(y) < L
and  < b(y). Condition (15) then does not hold if j(y) = 0. The best
response to the pure strategy res is therefore the pure strategy for. Now,
(15) obviously holds if j(y) = 1; moreover, if  > 0, the condition holds
as a strict inequality because E[max(x(y; Z); L) j y] > L by Assumption
1. Thus, res is itself the best response to for, thereby proving equilibrium
P . From the last argument, when 0 <  < b(y), there exists j(y) 2 (0; 1)
such that (15) holds as an equality. Solving for j(y) yields (7) and proves
equilibrium M .
Proof of Lemma 1: By Assumption 1, E[max(Xb; L) j xp] > L. The
denominator in (8) is therefore positive for all xp  L and b(xp) is well
dened over the interval [xminp ; L], where x
min
p is the worst possible expec-
tation when information is poor. Obviously, c  b(xminp ) is positive and
less than unity while b(L) is zero. Moreover, b(xp) is strictly decreasing. In-
deed, becausemax(Xb; L) is nondecreasing inXb, Assumption 2 implies that
E[max(Xb; L) j xp] is nondecreasing in xp. Hence the sign of @b(xp)=@xp is
the same as the sign of
 

E[max(Xb; L) j xp]  L+ (L  xp) @E[max(Xb; L) j xp]
@xp

< 0.
Proof of proposition 3: The second-best strategies 1() and 2() maxi-
mize v() as dened in (10). It is easily seen that the solution to this problem
is obtained by maximizing with respect to 1(xp) and 2(xp), for all xp, the
expression:
G(1(xp); 2(xp); xp)
 (1  ) 1(xp)L+ (1  1(xp))E[max(Xb; L) j xp]	
+ (1  )2(xp)L+ (1  2(xp))E[max(Xb; L) j xp]	
+ (1  )2 [L+ (1  1(xp))(1  2(xp))(xp   L)] :
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subject to i(xp) 2 [0; 1], i = 1; 2. Let i(xp) be the multiplier associated
with the constraint i(xp)  1 and i(xp) the multiplier associated with
i(xp)  0. Omitting the arguments, the Lagrangian is
L = G+ 1(1  1) + 11 + 2(1  2) + 22:
Writing H = E[max(Xb; L) j xp] to simplify notation, the necessary condi-
tions for a maximum are the Kuhn-Tucker rst-order conditions
@L=@1 = (1 )[(1 )(L xp)(1 2)  (H L)]  1 + 1=0; (16)
@L=@2 = (1 )[(1 )(L xp)(1 1)  (H L)]  2 + 2=0; (17)
together with complementary slackness and non-negativity of the multipli-
ers,
i(1  i) = ii = 0, i  0, i  0, i = 1; 2: (18)
Note thatH > L. Therefore, when xp  L or when xp < L and  > b(xp)
as dened in (8), (1  )(L  xp)(1 i)  (H  L) < 0 for all i. There is
then only one solution to (16), (17) and (18) and it involves i > 0, implying
i = 0, i = 1; 2. We henceforth discuss the case xp < L and  < b(xp).
We rst discard the possibility of corner solutions of the form 1 = 2 =
0 or 1 = 2 = 1. Consider the rst possibility. With 1 = 2 = 0, the term
in brackets in (16) and (17) is positive since (1 )(L xp) (H L) > 0 for
 < b(xp). The conditions are therefore satised only if 1 > 0 and 2 > 0,
which in turn implies 1 = 2 = 1, a contradiction. Similarly, noting that
the term in brackets is negative if 1 = 2 = 1, the conditions are then
satised only if 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, which implies 1 = 2 = 0, again a
contradiction.
We now show that the conditions are satised by a corner solution of the
form 1 = 1 and 2 = 0. By the above argument, 2 = 0 in (16) implies
1 > 0 and therefore 1 = 1. In (17), 1 = 1 implies 2 > 0, hence 2 = 0.
This corner solution corresponds to the equilibrium P .
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Finally, it is easily seen that the term in brackets in (16) and (17) is zero
if 1 = 2 = , where the latter is as dened in (7). Together with i =
i = 0, i = 1; 2, this therefore constitutes another possible solution to the
set of necessary conditions. It is the only interior solution and corresponds
to the equilibrium M .
To conclude the proof for the case xp < L and  < b(xp), we therefore
need to compare the strategies P and M . Substituting in the denition of
G, the P strategies yield
GP () = (1  )(L+ H);
where the resulting value of G has been written as a function of . Noting
that the M strategies satisfy
1   = 
1  
H   L
L  xp
and substituting in the denition of G yields
GM () = 2(1  )

L+
(H   L)2
(1  )(L  xp)

+ (1  )(L  H):
Therefore
()  GP () GM ()
= 2(1  )(H   L)

1  (H   L)
(1  )(L  xp)

:
This function is a quadratic in , with roots at  = 0 and  = b(xp) =
(L   xp)=(H   xp). For  2 (0;b(xp)), () > 0 implying that the P
strategies solve the maximization problem.
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